[Militant, No 449, 30 March 1979, p 10-11]
With the downfall of the Shah, Iranian society has been shaken to its foundations. All the social and political contradictions repressed under the old order have now come to the surface. The repression of women, the denial of national rights to the Kurds, Baluchis and other nationalities who comprise 50% of the old Empire.
It is less than six weeks since the workers rose to defeat the attempted counter-revolution of the Imperial Guard. The army remains, but is only a skeleton of its former self. Bazargan desperately trying to recreate a stable capitalist state machine. But effective power rests with the Revolutionary Islamic Committees, who are under enormous pressure from the working class. Khomeini attempts to perform a balancing act between this pressure and his creation, the Bazargan government.
In this, the first of a series of articles, our correspondent, recently in Tehran, reports on the new power in Iran, the Revolutionary Committees and the workers‘ movement.
Bazargan’s government has, at this stage, no real forces of its own. It has no way in which it can enforce its decisions. Bazargan is clearly striving to preserve capitalism and to rebuild the capitalist state machine in Iran, but is finding this exceptionally difficult. The real power is in the hands of Khomeini’s committee and the militia which it controls.
The main work of Bazargan has been directed towards trying to rebuild the armed forces and police, with little success. Many soldiers are refusing to return to their barracks, and many of those who have reported back are only being asked to sign on once a day.
The armed forces are in complete turmoil. There has been enormous opposition to the appointment of senior officers from the Shah’s regime to leading commands in what is now the Iranian National Islamic Army.
In the first. two weeks of Bazargan’s government, there were four different Air Force commanders and two heads of the Gendarmerie appointed. In addition, there has been a struggle put up by serving conscripts that they should only have to serve one year in the armed forces, as will be the case with all new conscripts.
This has meant that in spite of the hostility between them, Bazargan, who was appointed by Khomeini to be prime minister, has been forced to rely on Khomeini in order to carry out any measures whatsoever. This has been most clearly seen in the question of cabinet decisions and the re-opening of police stations.
All cabinet decisions are being sent to Khomeini’s Central Revolutionary Islamic Committee for final approval before being enacted. In the same way, the cabinet has no real choice but to rubber stamp any decisions of Khomeini’s committee, like its ban on the importation of frozen meat and the appointment of a new Public Prosecutor – „on the orders of the leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini“ (Iranian News Agency 4 March).
Islamic Militia
Over the past few weeks, steady progress has been made in the re-opening of the police stations burnt and closed down during the insurrection. But even where the police stations have been re-opened and new police commanders appointed, the police are still generally unarmed and only operate in conjunction with the local. Revolutionary Islamic Committees and their militias.
Whenever the police go out on a call, they are always with armed members of Khomeini’s militia, which is now being re-organised by both the government and Khomeini into a Revolutionary Islamic Guard designed to back up the police.
The Revolutionary Islamic Committees are entirely unelected bodies, generally consisting of a number of mullahs (priests) based in a local mosque who enforce their decisions with the local Islamic militia. Because of the absence of any conscious working class leadership, political power has in many senses passed to the Muslim clergy.
In many districts, especially the more outlying ones, the clergy have been able to establish complete control. For instance, in Khorramshahr it was the local leading priest. Ayatollah Shobeir Khagani, who personally appointed the new chief of the Police Department. In the outlying districts, too, the clergy have started trying to impose the old Muslim punishments of amputations for stealing and whippings for drinking, gambling and adultery.
Khomeini’s Central Revolutionary Islamic Committee keeps a strong grip on the local committees by appointing, and where necessary dismissing, members and their chairmen. The main role of the local committees is keeping ‚law and order‘ and where „propaganda against the Islamic revolution“ is observed in the form of tapes, periodicals and so forth by individuals or groups, the committees are „obliged to take action after full consultation with the local clergy.“
Already, Muslim fanatics have begun harassing the liberal Tehran papers. Some small leftist groups have had their publications seized or premises attacked and the new TV and radio director. Sadegh Qotbzadeh. is enforcing censorship against the left.
The TV. for instance, did not report the 10 March march against enforced wearing of the veil until Sunday, because „showing the film on Saturday would only have led to more confusion and chaos over the veil issue.“
Qotbzadeh has generously said that leftist political parties will be given four minutes each to introduce themselves on TV, as a sop to those protesting against the new censorship of those opposed to or critical of Bazargan or Khomeini.
The strength of the clergy in the major centres does not entirely rest on the grip which religion still has over large numbers of Iranians. It is also because during the struggle against the Shah the priests‘ speeches were seen as the only calls for freedom, equality and the overthrow of the dictatorship. unlike those of the National Front leaders who all along were prepared to compromise with the Shah. in return for a „constitutional monarchy“. At the same time, however, this support was not for the reactionary ideas of the priests. Increasingly. the mullahs are facing opposition to their efforts to turn back the clock to the Middle Ages.
Khomeini himself, despite the enormous popularity which he currently enjoys, has been under continual pressure since he returned from Paris. In spite of his rigid position during the last year that the Shah would have to go, Khomeini has on other issues often been forced to retreat.
Throughout last year Khomeini called for the election of a Constituent Assembly to decide upon Iran’s new form of government after the overthrow of the Shah.
Speaking. on 17th February this year, Khomeini said that the main task of Bazargan’s Provisional government „was to hold elections for a Constituent Assembly which would organise a referendum on Iran’s political future.“
But on 24th February the government, with Khomeini’s backing, announced that the referendum would be held as soon as possible and before the elections to the Constituent Assembly. Five days later, it was announced that the only question on the ballot paper would be approval of the creation of an Islamic Republic. Two days before this announcement the Information Minister Naser Minachi said that the draft Constitutional Law of the Islamic republic had already been written – though up to the present it has not been published – and „handed over to the Ayatollah Khomeini.”
The reason behind these frantic moves has been Khomeini’s fear of losing his position. The election of a Constituent Assembly would hasten the development of political parties and struggles, especially as the working class has thrust forward with its own demands. Already aware of the growth of class conflicts in industry and unrest in the countryside that is undermining his support, Khomeini. backed by Bazargan, has converted the constitutional referendum into a confidence vote and ratification of his policies.
Confident of winning an enormous majority in the referendum. Khomeini hopes that this will strengthen his position against the growing working class movement.
Already. both Khomeini and the government have been campaigning, under the banner of Islamic nationalism, against the spread of socialism among the working class. In Abadan, an estimated 40% of oil field production and maintenance workers support socialist ideas.
On leaving Tehran for the religious centre of Qom, Khomeini urged workers to ignore people who enter their factories with „attractive slogans … Those people who go among our workers … are mercenaries of those who used to serve the deposed king. Therefore it is the duty of our workers to bar such elements from their own circles.“
This attack on the left was ‚balanced‘ with a call on the government to cancel the past six months‘ water and power bills for „low-income people“. Khomeini has been quite consistent in opposing the left. On hearing that some workers wanted to continue the general strike until their political demands had been met Khomeini said these „people are traitors. We should smash them in the mouth.“
In spite of Khomeini’s influence, however, the past weeks have seen a growing development of the workers‘ movement in Iran. In many factories workers‘ committees or trade unions are being formed, and the workers are drawing up a list of demands. These demands generally include back pay for the period of the general strike; payment of the Iranian New Year bonus (due on 20th March): reinstatement of sacked workers: replacement of the old management.
The attempts of Khomeini supporters to hinder these developments have already led to clashes such as one at the Iran National car assembly plant between those supporting the old bosses and workers wanting to elect new managers. The plant was closed down for two weeks and the local Revolutionary Islamic Committee arrested a number of workers who the bosses said were ‚troublemakers
Assistant Prime Minister Amir Entezam complained at the end of February that „none of the country’s factories were functioning at present because workers were holding continual political meetings. The ‚back to work‘ orders issued by Ayatollah Khomeini and Premier Bazargan were not being obeyed by left wing workers who were demanding to elect their own managers and refusing to accept government appointees.“
Absence of mass workers‘ party
It has been in this situation of a developing working class movement that Bazargan, despite the capitalists‘ alarm at some of the mullahs‘ utopian ideas, has been forced to lean on Khomeini’s Central Revolutionary Islamic Committee for support as the government has no forces of its own. This is the reason why, in spite of the attacks by Bazargan and other cabinet ministers on the unrestricted power of the Revolutionary Islamic Committees the government works with Khomeini and seeks to integrate his forces into the state machine.
Bazargan and company obviously hope that in this way they can also seek to control Khomeini and his militia. But in reality, if there was any clash between the two in the near future. Bazargan would have no forces whatsoever to rely upon.
Bazargan ’s government, like Khomeini, has been forced time and time again to alter its policies under pressure from the working class. At first it said that no Now Ruz (new year) bonus would be paid; then it was forced to reverse its policies. Similarly, the government has been forced to do an about-turn over whether serving conscripts should complete two years in the armed forces.
It is this growing pressure of the working class which is the key to the future development of the Iranian revolution. At the present time, while many workers are organising in the factories, refineries and other workplaces and beginning to challenge the bosses‘ right to manage. there has not yet been the emergence of the working class acting with its own conscious political aims on the political arena.
The pressure of the working class is felt everywhere. It affects every move of Khomeini and Bazargan, but the absence, at present, of an independent. mass workers‘ party and mass trade unions means that no clear alternative is posed to either Bazargan’s attempts to save capitalism and rebuild the capitalist state, or to Khomeini’s mixture of utopian and reactionary policies.
The key question facing the Iranian revolution is now the creation of a mass workers‘ party with a socialist programme which will be independent of both Bazargan and Khomeini. The largest left forces in Iran at the moment, the ‚Communist‘ Tudeh Party, the ‚Marxist‘ Fedayeen Khalq guerrillas, and the Islamic Mojahedin guerrillas, do not pursue an independent policy. They all seek to link themselves up with Khomeini, in spite of the clergy’s attempts to hold back the development of an independent workers‘ movement.
Iran is in a profound crisis. Over a quarter of the working population, it is estimated, 3 to 3.5 million, is unemployed. Many of the factories recently developed to assemble or package imports from outside (ranging from cars, TVs, to butter) have shut down, both because of shortages of supplies and because Khomeini is demanding an end to such assembly industries and the development of independent Iranian-based production.
In spite of statements like those of the new Central Bank governor, Mohammad Ali Mowlavi, that there will be no nationalisation of the banks and that „free competition would be encouraged as a means of strengthening the private sector“, no capitalist will make new investments in Iran until the situation is under the control of a stable capitalist government.
Many of the Iranian capitalists have either left the country or are planning to run away when they are allowed to leave.
Only through the working class consciously taking over the running of the country and carrying out the nationalisation, under democratic control and management, of the major companies can Iran’s resources be used in the interests of the Iranian masses. But the implementation of such a policy requires the building of an Iranian working class movement with a clear socialist programme.
This is the task which has to be begun today around a programme of both political and social demands: A programme which counterposes democratically elected workers‘ committees to the unelected Revolutionary Islamic Committees and to Bazargan’s attempts to rebuild the capitalist state machine; a policy which takes up the questions of a five-day, 40-hour week, a minimum wage, the rights of women, and of a socialist plan of production.
Such a movement would pose the alternative of a socialist Iran to the cloudy
Islamic ideas of Khomeini and the capitalist schemes of Bazargan.
National Question
The recent clashes in Kurdistan, moreover, have emphasised again that the national question is a vital issue in Iran. Only half the population of Iran is actually Iranian, and for the working class movement a correct national policy is essential if it is to avoid the division of the working class on national lines.
The right of the different nationalities to self-determination has to be supported, while at the same time fighting for a united struggle for a socialist Iran which would grant full democratic rights of autonomy to all the different nationalities within its borders.
Only the emergence of a strong working class movement capable of taking power can stop Iran sliding into chaos, firmly win the democratic rights for which the masses struggled against the Shah, and prevent the victory of counter-revolution in the future.
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