[Militant, No 506, 6 June 1980, p. 10]
The first meeting of the newly elected Majlis, parliament, opened the way for a further round in the power struggle which has been unfolding in Iran.
The recent sharp manoeuvres and infighting around the Presidency and the Revolutionary Council have reflected the deadlock which the Iranian revolution is presently in.
The revolution’s driving force was the working class which undermined the Shah’s regime through a four month long General Strike and finally toppled it in the 9-11 February Tehran insurrection last year.
But there was no central workers’ organisation and since the overthrow of the Shah, Khomeini and the other leading mullahs have been able to prevent the development of an independent workers’ movement.
This strategy has been considerably aided by the Tudeh (‘communist’) Party’s tail-ending of what they call the “Imam’s line”. While pressure from the working class has forced the Revolutionary Council to grant reforms and take some radical measures against capitalism it has not been able to put its own stamp on the revolution’s development.
Although the working class has not, so far, consciously led the revolution, its immense strength and combativity stands in the way of any attempted imperialist intervention or restoration of the Shah’s regime. This has produced a situation of deadlock over the revolution’s future. Until this is broken in one way or another, personalities and clique struggles can have a great influence on events.
The continual twists and turns over what to do with the American hostages has reflected these struggles. There can be no doubt that the students seizure of the US Embassy and the hostages received enormous popular support. The Iranian masses saw this action as a blow against imperialism and retaliation for Carter allowing the ex-Shah to enter the USA.
Faced with massive popular backing for the Embassy occupation and a continual ebbing in their own support Khomeini and the Revolutionary Council supported the students. This was in direct contrast to their hostility to the first attack on the US Embassy eight and a half months before. Khomeini has utilised the enormous wave of anger against the Carter government to re-build his position and get accepted a new constitution which granted the mullahs great powers.
However as the holding of the hostages has dragged on the fundamental social and political issues facing the Iranian people have begun to resurface and put pressure on Banisadr and the Revolutionary Council. This in turn has given a sharper twist to the conflict between Banisadr and the mullahs, especially Ayatollah Beheshti, leader of the largest party in the Majlis, the Islamic Republican Party (IRP).
Banisadr accused Beheshti in mid-May of trying ‘‘to establish an obscurantist political dictatorship by waving the false banner of economic equalisation.’ But neither can take the revolution forward. Beheshti is attempting to consolidate the mullahs’ powers by using both religious and demagogic radical slogans to rally support. At the same time Banisadr has been pleading with the Western powers not to take tough measures against Iran.
Strong sanctions, Banisadr said, would not economically affect Iran but ‘‘politically it would be a catastrophe.” It could even become the final straw leading to the complete overthrow of capitalism in Iran. It is for this reason that most Western powers are proceeding slowly on the hostages issue, not wishing to provoke a new radicalisation inside Iran.
So far the Iranian revolution has failed to deliver the goods. The Iranian masses in supporting the call for an ‘Islamic Republic’ saw this as a blow against the rich and an opportunity to build a new society which would be run in the interests of all.
But this utopian dream has not materialised. Despite some of the reforms which have been carried out there is still raging inflation, mass unemployment and the existence of a ruling elite.
Even when reforms have been granted, they have often only been partial or quickly limited in scope. On 7 January the Revolutionary Council proclaimed that the working week ‘‘is the same for workers and office employees and is 40 hours.”
But two days later the same Revolutionary Council said that “the 40-hour working week applies only to the workers and office employees covered by the National Employment Act and is nothing to do with the workers employed in the industrial sector … the working week for such workers is still 48 hours.”
In order to control the discontent which had been openly expressed the mullahs unleashed in April a wave of attacks directed against the leftist groups, primarily the secular Fedayeen-e-Khalq and the radical Muslim Mojahedin-e-Khalq.
These attacks, made by street gangs or the so-called Hezbollah (Party of God) followers organised by mullahs, were made against the leftist bases inside the universities and colleges which they had moved into after their city offices had been shut down last August.
Simultaneously a renewed offensive was launched against the Kurdish minority in North West Iran in an attempt to force back under central control the national minorities of Iran, which together make up half the population.
Khomeini and the mullahs are attempting to browbeat all opposition in submission to their rule. Khomeini stated that. “If the Iranian nation stood against the West, we want our youth to stand against it. If our nation stands against Communism, we want all our university people to stand against it.”
In other words, no opposition to the unelected Revolutionary Council!
The seeming success of Khomeini, Beheshti and the other priests in retaining their domineering position has only been based on desperate manoeuvres of granting sudden substantial concessions, rallying religious fervour, vitriolic attacks against the ex-Shah and US imperialism and when all else fails physical repression against their opponents.
While this combination of tactics has worked during the last 15 months, the mullahs have not been able to resolve any of the fundamental social issues facing Iran.“
This is why they are in continual danger of losing support. The sudden shifts in the masses’ opinions, reflected in the seemingly contradictory election results, are indicators of a search for an answer to the fundamental problems which have still not been settled.
While it is likely that the priest-dominated Islamic Republican Party will control the Majlis and continue to hold the main reins of power for the immediate period, this situation cannot continue indefinitely. The mullahs have no clear policy whatsoever. Quotations from the Koran and reactionary prejudices cannot provide an answer to any of the social, economic or national problems facing Iran.
Banisadr will attempt to push the mullahs into a purely decorative role, either by leaning on the masses for support or by collaborating with the pro-capitalist elements which remain in the state machine and armed forces who want to halt the revolution before it goes any further.
But overshadowing the struggle for power in Iran, between the different cliques is the critical situation the country is in. Despite its huge resources and development Iran has been affected by severe economic problems for years.
Indeed one of the catalysts of the revolution was the Shah’s austerity policy of autumn 1976. Whichever clique comes to power will be faced with immense problems which clash with the aroused expectations of the masses.
It is inevitable that if Iran remains on a capitalist basis it will witness a sharpening class polarisation, which will eventually lead to the building of an independent workers’ movement. Worsening national conflicts could also bring about the break-up of Iran.
But, on the other hand, given the chaotic situation which Iran is in, it is quite conceivable that either the mullahs or Banisadr would be forced to lean on the masses and finally smash the landlordism and capitalism in Iran.
The regime which would emerge from such a process would not be a workers’ democracy, but similar to the kind of regime which exists in Russia, China and Eastern Europe. A society which would place before the working class the task of carrying through a new, political revolution to remove the bureaucratic caste which would install itself at the head of such a deformed workers’ state.
The crucial factor which has overshadowed the Iranian revolution has ben the absence of a mass workers’ party, armed with a Marxist programme, which could have prevented the revolution’s leadership falling into the hands of mullahs, bourgeois and nationalist leaders.
Such a party, basing itself on Iran’s 3.5 million manufacturing and construction workers, could already have led the revolution towards the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of a democratic workers’ republic. While such a party has not yet arisen in Iran the Iranian workers’ own experiences are preparing the ground for such its growth in the future.
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