[Militant International Review, No 28, January 1985, p. 9-15]
Peter Taaffe analyses the recently published memoirs of Pyotor Grigorenko.
The figure of Grigorenko is familiar to those who followed the so-called „dissident“ movement in Russia in the 1960’s and early 1970’s. Because of his determined and heroic opposition to Stalinism he was the only Red Army General to have been exiled by the regime.
He was also one of the most prominent victims of the barbaric “psychiatric” treatment meted out by the KGB to its opponents. Grigorenko has now recounted these and many other experiences in an interesting biography which was published in this country in 1983. For Marxists the book is of special interest. Grigorenko came from the bureaucratic elite itself. He was personally acquainted with the summits of the bureaucracy, Brezhnev, Khrushchev, Andropov and many others. He traces out his evolution from a case-hardened „Stalinist“ to an implacable opponent of the regime. The book is quite fascinating in showing the inner mechanics of the bureaucracy. The most illuminating pages are those which deal with the post-Stalin era.
In the aftermath of Stalin’s death, even the bureaucracy itself, at least at its lowest levels, was shaken by the revelations of Khrushchev at the 20th Party Congress. But Grigorenko was not just a liberal critic of the regime. At a certain stage in his development he approaches a “Trotskyist” criticism of the Stalinist regime. The chapters which deal with the “rebirth of Leninism” are the most interesting in the whole book. But Grigorenko also supplies an invaluable account of the blunders of Stalin in the collectivisation adventure, in the decimation of the officer corps during the purges of the 1930s and the criminal blunders of the great „war leader“.
As a raw young organiser from a peasant background in the Komsomol (Young Communist League) in 1924 he participated in the struggle against Trotsky. “I could not stay on the sidelines. I read The Lessons of October and I read the periodical press. I was uneasy. Could Trotsky possibly be right? Might the creation of a socialist society be impossible? Would we perish if the world revolution did not come to our aid? At just this time Stalin’s essay ‘Trotskyism or Leninism’ appeared in The Workers newspaper. With characteristic simplicity (today I will call it over simplicity) Stalin refuted Trotsky’s affirmations one by one. We could, he wrote, succeed at building socialism in our country. The delay of the world revolution must not stop us … We were obliged to carry out the cause of the world revolution ourselves. I agreed with Stalin’s every word. He liberated me from all doubt. From then on his essay was with me always. I never tired from explaining it to my friends. It was my best weapon during the arguments with the Trotskyists.” [p. 25]
Revolution isolated
The leaders of the Russian Revolution Lenin and Trotsky never conceived that they could build socialism in one country, let alone in a backward, predominantly peasant country like Russia. The beginning of socialism would require a higher level of technique – productivity of labour – than even the most highly developed capitalist country. Russia never possessed either the economic base or the cultural resources to proceed to build „socialism in one country“. The Russian Revolution was envisaged as the beginning of the international revolution. Only on an international plane through a world plan of production would it be possible to begin to construct socialism.
However the Russian Revolution could be the spark which could set in train a series of revolutions in Germany, France, Italy, Britain and throughout Western Europe, in turn spreading to the citadel of world capitalism, America itself. These revolutions would come to the aid of Russia with enormous economic and cultural assistance. The lag of the world revolution, entirely due to the betrayal of the revolution in Germany in 1918, in Italy in 1920 etc. by the leaders of the Social Democracy led to the isolation of the Russian Revolution. Its economic and cultural backwardness, together with the decimation of the flower of the Russian proletariat in the Civil War, were the factors which led to the usurpation of power by the bureaucratic elite, personified by the rise and triumph of Stalin.
Stalinism in its initial stage based itself on those like Grigorenko, with little theoretical or political education, from a backward rural background (Grigorenko came from a small farm in Ukraine). However the young Grigorenko was to question many aspects of the regime in the following years. He witnessed and protested at the ruinous effects of the forced collectivisation. But Grigorenko did not connect Stalin with the crimes of the bureaucracy. Like many other fervent Stalinists at the time it was not the great „helmsman“ but his underlings who were „responsible“ for the crimes which he saw at first hand.
Some of the best passages reinforce the evidence furnished by Leopold Trepper in his monumental work „The Great Game” which completely shatters the myth that despite any other “drawbacks” Stalin was at least „a great war leader“. In the purge trials of 1937 to 1938 Stalin slaughtered 70% of the officer corps of the Red Army.
Chief amongst those who went to the firing squad were outstanding military leaders such as Tukhachevsky and Yakir. The former had developed the theory of the Blitzkrieg long before the Nazis had either developed or carried through this method of warfare. The actions of Stalin were no mere caprice on his part. As Trotsky pointed out the purges at the time were a one-sided civil war to decimate the last remnants of the Bolshevik Party.
Stalin feared any outstanding figure associated with the heroic period of the Russian Revolution. In the event of a revolt of the Russian proletariat these figures, not withstanding their previous capitulation to Stalin, could have become a focal point of opposition. So also the officer corps, particularly outstanding generals like Tukhachevsky and Yakir, could have become a pole of attraction to those who opposed the untrammelled, ruthless and blood thirsty regime of Stalin. Traditionally the Stalinist apparatus in the party and the government feared too great an independence on the part of the officer corps. The recent removal of Marshal Ogarkov as the Russian chief of Military staff is connected with the fear of the party and state bureaucracy of the officer corps becoming an oppositional force. Hence the denunciations of unnamed generals who it seems harbour „Bonapartist“ tendencies.
Stalin’s military blunders
If Stalin had been a conscious agent of the Nazis he could not have been more successful in sabotaging the military defence of Russia. Grigorenko gives examples of Stalin’s crimes drawn from his own experiences. He personally participated in the fortifications on the Western front. Yet, as he remarks, „they were blown up without having fired even once at the enemy. I do not know how future historians will explain this crime against our people. Contemporary historians ignore it. I cannot offer an explanation myself.
The Soviet government squeezed billions of roubles (by my calculations not less than 120 billion) out of the people to construct impregnable fortifications along the Western boundary from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. Then, right before the war in the spring of 1941, powerful explosions thundered along the entire 1200 kilometre length of these fortifications. On Stalin’s personal orders reinforced concrete coponiers, semi-coponiers, tens of thousands of permanent fortifications were blown into the air. No better gift could have been given to Hitler’s Barbarossa plan.“ [p. 46-47] Grigorenko asks:“How could this have taken place? Stalin’s justifications must be that he was insane“.
There are many other examples of Stalin’s blindness, empiricism and “insanity“. Hitler’s invasion plans, including the exact date of when it was to begin, had been supplied to Stalin but he chose to ignore it as „Nazi propaganda“. So unprepared were the Russians’ armed forces that the Nazis succeeded in destroying most of the Russian planes while they were still on the ground! Moreover it is not generally realised that at the outbreak of the Second World War the Russian armies had a greater fire power than that of Nazi Germany. Stalin had replaced the flower of the Red Army with military idiots like Voroshilov. This „genius” advocated the use of cavalry to confront the tanks of the Nazis!
Grigorenko shows that it was the release from prison of those like Rokossovsky and Zhukov, together with many other generals who were awaiting execution in the Stalinist dungeons at the time of the invasion, which was a crucial factor in preventing the complete triumph of the Nazis. Other factors were the barbarism of the Nazi regime which completely repelled the peoples of Russia. The advantages of a planned economy also allowed Russia to produce the weaponry to defeat the Nazis despite the fact that Hitler had the industry and resources of the whole of Europe at his disposal. At the outbreak of the, war the “great helmsman“ was so shaken by the scale of the disaster and fear of the wrath of an outraged people that he was incommunicado for a period of days.
There is nothing new in Grigorenko’s accounts of the military blunders and crimes of Stalin and the bureaucratic elite he represented. But invaluable first hand evidence is supplied which shatters once and for all the myth built up around Stalin which even people like Michael Foot accepted in the past:
“Of course, the achievements of the Stalin era were monumental in scale. Under his guidance the Soviet Union was collectivised and a largely peasant people were made literate. Thanks to these achievements, the Russian armies which were broken by the Germans in the First World War repelled and destroyed them in the Second. … who in the face of these colossal events, will dare to question Stalin’s greatness? How superhuman must be the mind which presided over these world-shattering developments?“ – Michael Foot, writing in Tribune, 13 March, 1953.
Grigorenko and Brezhnev
During the period of the 30s, like many others, Grigorenko’s life hung by a threat. At one stage Stalin made enquiries about Grigorenko’s alleged „sabotage“ to his superior. He was protected from the firing squad by his commanding officer. It was during the 1930s that Grigorenko first made acquaintance with Brezhnev who was to eventually rise to the position of chief bureaucrat. His pen portrait of Brezhnev describes not just one individual but a social type which still dominates Russian society. „It is not gratuitously that I describe Brezhnev’s many facial expressions. His smile reminded me of the smile of a marionette. During my nine months of service under the Party leadership of Brezhnev I observed on him a whole repertoire of expressions. The first was an obsequious, servile smile; he donned this in the presence of higher-ups. It covered the area between his ears, the end of his nose to his chin and it looked as if it had been glued on or as if somewhere someone was pulling strings, since it suddenly would appear in full scale without any transition; someone pulled a different string and it disappeared just as suddenly.” [p. 182]
Brezhnev was usually seen in public with a chest full of war medals. But Grigorenko comments: „everyone knows that Brezhnev did not see battle, but still they depict things as if Brezhnev had himself led an attack. He too remembers the past rather poorly. If he had had a better memory he would be ashamed to have received the order of the Hero of the Soviet Union for participation in the battle actions of any army in which not one of the commanders or members of the military council received such an honour”. [p. 183]
However the most interesting chapters of Grigorenko’s book are those which deal with the period following the death of Stalin and particularly the aftermath of the 20th Party Congress where Khrushchev detailed the crimes of Stalin. He points out that in the early 1960s things were „very strained in both my service and civilian lives. My attitude towards the leaders became increasingly critical. It was more and more difficult for me not to react to the illegalities and pompous trivialities of the rulers of my country. When we went through the second post war currency reform (devaluation) I protested. Stalin’s devaluation which was openly extortionate had not aroused the protest in me but I had changed. Khrushchev’s declaration that no one gained or lost anything from his reform angered me.” [p. 231]
20th party congress
Khrushchev’s measures provoked discontent in the population. At the same time Grigorenko came up against the dead hand of the bureaucracy. „I began to hear account after account of how difficult it was to get backing for any new inventions. However significant and innovative, the government seemed to prefer sticking with the old. Technologically we were about 15 years behind the United States. I couldn’t believe we were doing everything possible to catch up. It angered me. I had many acquaintances from various strata: directors of big enterprises, officials of the State Planning Commission, heads of agricultural organisations, teachers, workers, collective farmers – all were dissatisfied. All talked about instances of inefficiency, illegality, bureaucracy, stupidity. There was no agency or bureau to which we could take our dissatisfaction and so it began to appear in ordinary conversations.“ [p. 231]
Grigorenko wrestled with the dilemma, what to do. “I found it difficult to tolerate the hypocrisy of the rulers, but at the same time I knew that speaking out would ruin my entire way of life, one which suited me perfectly. Therefore I strove to suppress my mood of protest by my own strength of will and with the help of my work.“ [p. 232]
Thus at this stage even within the bureaucracy the impasse of the regime provoked a profound questioning mood. “I’m tired of my General’s insignia“ writes Grigorenko, “ of my high pay, of my special refreshment bars and stores.” [p. 233] At another stage he declares „What do I care about some collective farmers or workers who are rotting in prison or concentration camps? I’ll go on living as I please. Enjoy my life.” And then reproaching himself „What a rat you are, Pyotor Grigoryevich“. [p. 233]
This period of wrestling with his conscience came to a head at the Lenin District Moscow Party Conference which Grigorenko attended as a delegate on 7 September, 1961. All the accumulated bitterness and discontent which he felt for the regime spilled out in an astonishing outburst at this gathering of the bureaucracy itself. Intervening in a discussion on the programme of the “Communist Party” he declared: „What is our experience on the question of the state and the personality cult. Stalin puts himself above the party. This the central committee itself has established. Even more importantly there is in the experience of our party the case of a man who was not only alien to the party but who was hostile to our entire system and who turned out to be in charge of the highest organ of the government, the state, and the party. I am thinking of Beria If his was an isolated case we might have no cause for alarm.” [p. 239] Grigorenko then went on to show other “deviations” and crimes of Stalinist leaders.
„Let us imagine Khrushchev had been destroyed like Voznesensky and others. After all, it was pure coincidence that Stalin died so early. He could have lived till 90“. This naturally caused a stir in the audience of bureaucrats. However his next statement produced uproar: „we are approving a project for a programme in which the personality cult is condemned but the question arises: Is everything possible being done to prevent the repetition of a personality cult while the personality itself is perhaps arising.“ [p. 240]
The chairman of the conference naturally tried then to prevent Grigorenko from going on. But the audience roared „let him continue” and a decision in favour of Grigorenko continuing was carried by a majority of those present. But then Grigorenko goes to the heart of the Stalinist regime. “‘I consider that the principal paths along which the development of the personality cult took place were, in the first place, the abolition of the party maximum, and that very few people return to work at production, that they became bureaucrats, that they allowed the struggle for the purity of the ranks of the party to weaken.
“Just look, if you will: How often it is written that someone stole or deceived customers, and then it is reported that so and so has been given a party penalty. Is it permissible for such people to be kept in the party?” After making further criticisms of the regime Grigorenko went on to say: ‘My concrete proposals are the following: to strengthen the democratisation of elections, and to strengthen similarly the wide-scale replacement of officials and also our responsibility to voters. We must also abolish all conditions which give rise to violations of the Leninist principles involved, in particular high salaries and lack of replacement of officials. We must struggle for purity within the ranks of the party.
„We must write directly in the programme about the struggle against careerism, against deceit of the party and the state for the sake of personal advantage, something which is incompatible with party membership. If a Communist in a leading position is guilty of bureaucracy, philandering, servility, nepotism, or in any way suppresses criticism, he must be subjected to a severe party penalty, obligatorily removed from the position he occupies, and sent to do physical work in industry and agriculture“. [p. 240 f.] In the words of Grigorenko, this was met “applause“. Grigorenko’s statements mirror in outline the criticisms which Trotsky said would be taken up by the proletariat in its struggle against the bureaucracy. It is all the more remarkable that they emanated from within the charmed circle of the bureaucracy itself. Even more striking is the fact that those bureaucrats gathered at this conference approved of Grigorenko’s speech!
Questioning within bureaucracy
It was Trotsky who pointed out that in the event of a political revolution the movement of the proletariat would infect the lower and middle layers of the bureaucracy itself. They would be drawn behind the movement of the masses. In the post-Stalin era the simmering discontent at all levels in society burst out. Following Grigorenko’s speech a large crowd gathered in the hallway with one young man shouting, “they have been allowed to get too far out of hand! They pull rank even at a party conference. The General was speaking as a Communist – and then they let loose the big star – that Marshal – in order to shut his mouth. Those big shots have gotten out of hand“. [p. 241]
Nevertheless the bureaucratic tops managed to pressurise the conference, not without great difficulty, into compelling Grigorenko to surrender his credentials as a delegate. The Stalinist bureaucracy then unleashed the full power of its machine against Grigorenko. One Pravda journalist told Grigorenko: “‘your statement that the party was lucky that Khrushchev and others survived and that Stalin died early sounds like pure irony, pure mockery. But the most painful of all is your declaration that the personality cult originates in high salaries, lack of replacement personnel, and bureaucratisation. Also painful are your proposals on the democratisation of elections, on the responsibility for elected officers, on the institution of broad-scale replacement of officials, on the struggle for purity in the ranks of the party and the expulsion from the party of careerists, bribe takers and other rascals”. [p. 249]
A furious onslaught was launched against Grigorenko. The terror at the effect of his speech was shown in one particularly revealing encounter with a top party official, Serdyuk. At an official hearing this creature immediately denounced Grigorenko: “high salaries don’t suit him – can you believe it! Why didn’t you think about your own high salary?” [p. 258]
Response from youth
“I didn’t distinguish from the party” declared Grigorenko. „You don’t distinguish yourself! Don’t play at being holy! You differentiate and distinguish in everything very well indeed. You thought about your own high salary when you gave your speech. You are convinced that as a highly trained specialist you had a right to such a salary. But you were thinking about my high salary.” “He stressed the word my and throughout the tirade insulted me by using familiar rather than formal address.” [p. 258]
Serdyuk continued, „you want to have removability of high positions – don’t you! Well you don’t think about your own removability. You are a specialist and don’t need to be removed and replaced. You don’t think about being removed yourself. You want to have me replaced“. [p. 258-259]
Serdyuk went on: „He wants democracy, you see. So every good-for-nothing can meddle in the work of government and party institutions and hinder the efforts of conscientious officials. He wants free elections, you see, so that all kinds of demagogues can slander the conscientious Communists and can hinder the people from electing those who are most worthy. He spouted demagogy like that and then he had the effrontery to complain we didn’t deal with him lawfully, you see! Well we aren’t going to waste our time in your clever listen to your demagogy here! You can go.” Enraged Grigorenko declared to his wife: “They were gangsters! They were dissolute, demoralised men“. His wife calmly declared, “‘you have only just found that out. I’ve known it for a long time but now that you know about it, conduct yourself accordingly. Don’t put your head in the beast’s jaw.” [p. 259]
Grigorenko’s criticisms found an echo amongst students and his speech was published in clandestine leaflets. Perplexed and worried at the response which his mild criticisms of the regime evoked, Grigorenko then „out of habit went to Lenin for answers. Once again I sat down with his works, seeking proof that the present party line had been diverted from Leninism, seeking the means by which we could correct ourselves“. [p. 265] Grigorenko’s evolution in his opposition to the Stalinist regime, his groping for solutions to the problems he saw around him, is an indication of the process which will unfold and is unfolding at this present time, in a much sharper form amongst the Russian proletariat.
In Poland and the other states in Eastern Europe it is perhaps unlikely in the first instance that the opposition to Stalinism will look towards the works of Marx, Engels or Lenin. These figures are wrongly identified with the Stalinist regime. They are connected in the eyes of the masses (particularly Lenin) perhaps with the national oppression of the states of Eastern Europe by the Russian Stalinist regime. But in Russia the figure of Lenin is still revered as the founder of the state. The regime officially bases itself on “Marxism”. It is forced to circulate the works of Marx, of Engels, of Lenin in millions of copies. A brief acquaintance with these works, particularly with Lenin’s State and Revolution, would allow the average discerning citizen to compare the simple measures which Lenin proposes for a healthy workers’ state with the untrammeled rule of the bureaucratic elite!
Grigorenko misunderstands much in Lenin’s writings. He sees a contradiction in Lenin’s writings on such things as the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ and ‘democracy’ as well as on the ‘freedom of the press’. But Lenin’s alleged „inconsistencies“ are entirely due to the different circumstances in which he wrote at different times. Because he is not theoretically equipped with a knowledge of the basics of Marxism or the objective reasons which allowed the rise of the Stalinist dictatorship, Grigorenko draws a number of wrong conclusions. Nevertheless, basing ourselves on the material of Grigorenko, it is possible to see how the opposition to the Stalinist regime can move from isolated criticisms of Stalinism to seeing the need for a political revolution.
‘Alliance of True Leninists’
For instance, Grigorenko recalls that: “During the war I had been close to one radical officer and we had talked a great deal about the country and the party. I did not agree with many of his conclusions but concurred with his idea that after the war it would be necessary to change the course of the party sharply. During one conversation he mentioned that some people felt preparations for such changes should be taking place now. There was an organisation he said calling itself the ‘Alliance of True Leninists’ which was organised on the principle of a chain.
‘Each member of this alliance knew only the person who had enlisted him in it and those who he himself had enlisted. He might enlist ten members, but each would only know him. They would not know each other. It was impermissible also to know anyone outside your own cell, or group. If another member whom you did not know should try to enlist you in the Alliance you had to agree to enlistment without revealing that you were already a member. If one member was arrested, all those connected with him would act as end links of the organisations. The organisers of the Alliance believed in the infiltration of like thinkers into all of society, without creating any organisation, in as much as any organisation would be easily discovered through connections within it and organised activity“.
Grigorenko comments „at the time I did not agree to join the Alliance, but the idea intrigued me. Such a chain seemed indestructible, and it could accomplish quite a bit since it combined ideological unity (‘true Leninism’) with a broader sort of initiative“. [p. 270-271]
What this interesting little snippet shows is that during the war, when the blunders and crimes of Stalin and the bureaucracy must have been quite evident to widespread sections of the officers in particular, the idea of dealing with these gangsters in the aftermath of the war had already occurred to the more far-sighted and daring elements.
Forced underground
Grigorenko writes, „The thought of such a mass ideological organisation simply would not leave me. If I had known one of the Alliance members I would have joined right then. The officer who had attempted to recruit me died at the front, and I never met any other members. Several times I met people whom I suspected of Alliance activity, but I never strove to enter in permanent contact with them, though I believe the Alliance still existed and believed also that democratic trends in the CPSU arose from such a movement. I believe the organisation may still exist today, and it is precisely for this reason that I do not name the officer who proposed that I join the Alliance. I do not want to give even one small bit of evidence to the KGB”.
If such organisations have sprung up amongst army officers, i.e. from within the bureaucracy, imagine the developments amongst the mighty Russian proletariat. This proletariat, numbering 120 million strong, is potentially the most powerful proletariat on the planet. Grigorenko’s writings allow us to anticipate many such movements developing amongst the proletariat. Indeed he gives invaluable information on oppositional movements of the Russian working class which have been suppressed by the bureaucracy.
Grigorenko founded an underground revolutionary organisation: „Alliance for Struggle for the Rebirth of Leninism“. An introductory leaflet was produced on the 46th anniversary of the October Revolution. Another leaflet called for a: „struggle for the ousting of the government of bureaucrats and parasites, for free elections, control of the government by the people, and for frequent replacement of all persons in high positions, including the very highest“ [p. 272]. These very simple demands echo the demands of Lenin for a healthy workers’ state:
* No standing army, but an armed people.
* All officials to be elected by the workers’ organisations with the right of recall.
* All officials to receive the same wages as a skilled worker (because of a shortage of technicians the Bolsheviks were compelled to allow a clearly defined maximum differential of four to one: Lenin described this frankly as a „capitalist differential“).
* Popular participation in all administrative duties; direct management and control by Soviets („When everybody is a bureaucrat, nobody is a bureaucrat“).
In view of the experiences of Stalinism the proletariat, as in the Hungarian revolution, would add one other condition to those of Lenin for a healthy workers’ state – never again to permit a one-party regime.
Another leaflet criticised the food and bread shortages: “‘it answered the letter of the Central Committee which had claimed: ‘that bread shortages existed because slices were cut too thickly in the dining halls’! The elements, no matter how imperfectly formulated, of an alternative programme for an opposition party striving to overthrow the bureaucracy is outlined in Grigorenko’s writings at this stage. Moreover his efforts found a ready response particularly from the youth.
Nevertheless he showed extreme naivety in the methods employed to gather recruits to his cause. Thus, he went to the ‘Hammer and Sickle’ factory in Moscow himself personally to distribute leaflets. On another occasion he went to a railway station to distribute a leaflet ‘to the public at large’ wearing his general’s uniform! Inevitably Grigorenko was arrested with his sons and others who belonged to his organisation.
Grigorenko arrested
His accusers stated: „you have created an underground organisation which has set itself the task of overthrowing the Soviet government. Dealing with that is the task of the organs of state security and not of party commissions’“. [p. 281] Grigorenko replied “you are exaggerating. I did not create an organisation which set as its purpose the overthrow by force of the existing structure. I created an organisation for the dissemination of undistorted Leninism, for the exposure of its falsifiers’”. The KGB accuser then stated: „If the matter only concerned propaganda of Leninism why have you chosen to go underground? Teach it within the system of party and | political education and at meetings”. Grigorenko replied: „You know yourself that this is impossible. That Leninism has to be preached in the underground is best evidenced by the fact that the present party leadership has departed from Leninist positions and thereby lost the right to leadership of the party. Thus Communist Leninists have the right to struggle against the leadership.“ The bureaucracy was of course incapable of answering the points which Grigorenko raised in his interrogation.
One such interrogation concerned a leaflet he had produced on the „dispersal by shooting of the workers’ demonstration at Novocherkassk“. His interrogator stated: ‘You write in your leaflet that the troops shot down the workers at Novocherkassk, but after all the whole matter was quite different than you say it was.” Grigorenko replied: „How?“. His interrogator: „well violations of public law had taken place’.
Grigorenko then replied: „There were violations of public order in your version but in actual fact the Novocherkassk workers went out on the streets in a peaceful fashion. If there were hooligan or terrorist gangs which could only be dealt with with guns, why was this not reported in the press?“. Interrogator: „It was reported“. Grigorenko: „Where? In what newspaper? I did not read any such reports anywhere.” His interrogator, quite embarrassed, added, „in the local press. They convicted the troublemakers and the local press reported it“. Grigorenko said: “Well of course! They merely finished beating to death those who had not been shot on the streets. I know all about that.
“The local press briefly reported that there had been a trial of the initiators of public disorders and that fifteen persons were convicted in order to frighten the entire population of the city. Out of the fifteen, nine were’ sentenced to execution and the sentences carried out. What interests me is not that but who was guilty of firing upon a demonstration; who was guilty of the murder of several hundred people including women and children.
„And in particular I would like to know why the members of the politburo Mikoyan and Kozlov preferred bullets to words in their communications with the workers. This was a heinous crime. The bloodshed on the streets of Novocherkassk, Tbilisi, Temir-Tau, Priluki, Alexandrovov and other cities, has become an insurmountable obstacle between the party and the workers“.
Psychiatric torture
These revelations about the movements of the proletariat and its brutal repression show the tremendous subterranean opposition which existed in Russia then and which is even greater today. An indication of the fear, bordering on terror, which Grigorenko’s actions stimulated amongst the higher reaches of the bureaucracy is revealed by the fact that he learned later in 1965 that all the statements that he made during his interrogation had been taped and the tapes had been heard by all members of the Politburo.
Despite his hostility to the bureaucracy, and the devastating criticisms of its rule, Grigorenko’s opposition took mostly the form of an appeal to the more „enlightened“ sections of the bureaucracy to reform itself. Later on he was “‘ashamed to recollect what a rooster I must have seemed at the time. I suffered a great deal before I realised that I had no sympathisers at the Lubyanka, that not a single person I dealt with was guided by conscience and honesty, and that to feel oneself superior to the interrogator, to be able to outwit him in the investigation is, at the very least, a mistake“. [p. 285-286]
After his capture by the KGB Grigorenko was subjected to the most barbaric treatment in the psychiatric prisons of the Stalinist regime. His persecutors used the fact that he had suffered from shell shock during the war to diagnose him as „insane“. He was tried, in his absence, before a military collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR. The methods employed in these „psychiatric prisons’“ have been well documented by those like Bukovsky and others. However, the details provided by Grigorenko make the blood run cold.
The whole purpose of these prisons is to demoralise and break the spirit of those who oppose the regime. Drugs are administered which not only make the patient soporific but adversely affect the bowels, producing incontinence. Grigorenko was eventually released in 1965 and it was subsequently discovered that Brezhnev opposed this. Because of his previous experience with Grigorenko he wanted to keep him locked away in the regime’s hellholes.
Once out of prison Grigorenko found himself participating in the growing dissident movement of the 1960s and 70s. At the same time he was compelled to look for the most menial kind of work. He was forced to work as a street worker in Yalta and as a janitor. But he was still able to take up the cause of those who had suffered at the hands of the Stalinist regime. He is perhaps best known in the capitalist West as the champion of the oppressed nationalities and minorities of Russia.
Above all he was seen as the most energetic opponent of the crimes perpetrated by Stalin against the Tartar people. He was absolutely tireless in fighting for the restoration of the rights of these unfortunate people. Following the invasion of the Nazis the whole of the Crimean Tartar nation had been convicted of „treason“ by Stalin. In 1944 the whole nation had been deported from the bountiful Crimea into the deserts and the arid lands of Central Asia. In the words of Grigorenko „this cruel, senseless deportation in which over 46% of the Crimean Tartars had perished had rallied the people“. [p. 347]
Following the death of Stalin, a most stubborn and heroic campaign began for the restoration of the rights of the Crimean Tartars. They were demanding the right to return back to the Crimea, and the restoration of their nationality. Stalin’s heirs proved to be just as vicious towards the Tartar people. three times a commission of the Politburo had heard the case of the Tartars and then left things as they had been before.
The last time a delegation was received was in connection with the decree of the „Supreme Soviet” of 5 September, 1967. According to Grigorenko, „this was the most false, the most hypocritical decree of all those issued in respect to these people. It began with a declaration that the Crimean Tartars had been charged with treason to the motherland and that there was no basis on which this charge would be removed. But the annulment was justified by the fact that a new generation that had never known the war had come of age. The greatest treachery of all was that by this decree the Crimean Tartars were denied the right to their own nationality. They were referred to as „Citizens of Tartar nationality who previously lived in the Crimea“.
Andropov, who subsequently succeeded Brezhnev, was one of those who stubbornly resisted the demands of the Crimean Tartars. Grigorenko’s speech to a banquet of the Crimean Tartars held in 1967 received a tumultuous reception. Space does not permit the full speech to be printed here. But the response from the Tartars to one of the demands raised by Grigorenko completely shatters the charge of „treason“ levelled against the Crimean Tartars. In no way did these people show any “‘pro-capitalist“ or „pro-Nazi“ tendencies.
The Crimean Tartars
On the contrary Grigorenko’s call for „the re-establishment of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic” was met in the words of the author with “standing applause and cries of ‘Hail the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic’. These alleged “anti-Soviet“ peoples ended the meeting “in an uproar. You could barely make out what people were shouting but many begun to sing the Internationale“. There are not many pro-capitalist or pro-Nazi nations that are prone to sing the Internationale!
The Tartars then decided to return back to the Crimea and appropriately the official date chosen for the return was 21 April, Lenin’s birthday! Grigorenko’s speech had a devastating effect. The KGB complained that it had been reproduced in 8 million copies! The return of the Crimean Tartars met with the most brutal repression by the KGB. Some of them did manage to settle in their former homeland, but even today the Crimean Tartar problem has not been solved. In fact the national problem in Russia is one of the most serious issues confronting the Stalinist regime. It is completely incapable of satisfying the legitimate national aspirations of the Tartars, the Ukrainians, the Lithuanians, the Latvians, and the other nationalities which make up Russia.
Grigorenko also gives some very interesting material which shows that the movement in Czechoslovakia had an effect within Russia itself. Grigorenko was one of the very few who openly protested at the Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968. He had left Russia by the time of the Polish events. However, the movement in Poland would have had an even more profound effect.
The Czechoslovak events took the form of a liberal national Stalinist opposition to the Moscow bureaucracy. The movement in Poland despite the religious overtones, involved a revolution, although incomplete, of the Polish proletariat. Following the demonstration against the Czechoslovak intervention Grigorenko was re-arrested.
The bureaucracy realised that in the wake of the Czechoslovak events a free Grigorenko could become a dangerous pole of attraction for those opposing the Stalinist regime. He was therefore imprisoned once more, this time for a total of five years. An international campaign secured his release and exile, this time in the USA. The book ends with Grigorenko as an admirer of the “‘political system” in America, of “Radio Free Europe“ and of „Radio Liberty“. He has also returned to the bosom of the Russian Orthodox Church! But this in no way undermines the merit and importance of the book as an illustration of the process of opposition that is now unfolding to the Stalinist regime in Russia.
Despite his subsequent degeneration from an heroic fighter against the Stalinist regime to an admirer of capitalist America there is much to be learnt from this book. One of the factors in Grigorenko’s degeneration is the lack of theoretical understanding of Stalinism. The overwhelming majority of „dissidents“ have no real understanding of the causes of the Russian revolution, or of the material reasons which led to its subsequent degeneration. They criticise this or that aspect of the regime but do not have a worked out analysis of the society, the state nor a perspective as to how the situation can and will be changed.
At the same time the inhuman persecution which is meted out to all opponents of Stalinism developed in them an almost inevitable loathing and hatred of everything to do with the regime. They throw the baby out with the bathwater. In the case of Grigorenko the weak side of his character, his lack of theory was reinforced by his association with the „intellectuals” within the opposition dissident movement. Those like Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov and others have adopted a completely pro capitalist position. In the case of Solzhenitsyn he ended up as a supporter of the military-police dictatorship of Pinochet in Chile!
Things stand entirely differently with the as yet subterranean opposition of the proletariat in Russia. We already have had evidence in the trials of a group of young people recently who based themselves upon the works of Trotsky in their opposition to Stalinism. As we have pointed out in previous issues of the MIR it is the mighty Russian proletariat upon which a powerful opposition will develop to the Stalinist autocracy. This book allows us to anticipate such a movement.
Workers’ opposition decisive
If an individual like Grigorenko, from within the charmed circle of the bureaucracy itself, can evolve in the direction he did then how much more dangerous are the groups of oppositional workers which surely exist in every industrial area of Russia at the present time. No amount of denunciations, lunatic asylums, nor all the other refined means of persecution developed by the KGB will be capable of stopping the movement of the Russian proletariat once it erupts. Russian tanks could be sent into Hungary in 1956. The threat of a military intervention in Poland was used in order to terrify the leaders of Solidarity and prevent them from completing the political revolution in 1981. But once a movement of the Russian proletariat in the direction of political revolution unfolds in Moscow or Leningrad or any other of the major cities (at least in European Russia), what forces could be used by the Stalinist regime to suppress such a movement?
It would be impossible to send Poles, Hungarians, East Germans, Czechoslovaks, etc. against a political revolution in Russia. On the contrary these regimes themselves will be facing imminent overthrow once a movement of the Russian proletariat developed. It is in this context that we view Grigorenko’s valuable and important book. It gives us an insight into the workings of Stalinism and allows us to forecast its coming collapse in Russia and Eastern Europe.
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