[Militant No. 275, 17th October 1975, p. 5]
By Lynn Walsh
Once again in Portugal, an attempt to move to the right has unleashed new reserves of revolutionary energy from the ranks of the armed forces and the workers. As a counterpart to its efforts to conciliate Big Business and reassure the Western Governments, the VI Provisional Government of Admiral Pinheiro Azevedo has been attempting to restore “orthodox military discipline” in the armed forces. It seems to have completely failed. The latest attempt to put the brakes on the revolution and turn it to the right – not from the Spinolists as on 28th September and 11th March, but from so-called ‘moderates’ of the Armed Forces Movement [MFA] – has provoked a fresh demand for the complete democratisation of the MFA and for workers’ control over society generally.
After the fall of Goncalves, the moderates of the ‘Group of Nine’ quickly began to replace pro-Communist Party and other left wing commanders and to purge or even disband units known for their strong socialist sympathies. At first, because of the confusion that followed the ousting of Goncalves, they appeared to have some success, managing for instance, to disband the left wing ‘Fifth Division’ responsible for education and propaganda. Last week, however, the closure of the left wing military driving school in Oporto rebounded on the ‘moderate’ Northern Commander when thousands of soldiers occupied a key artillery barracks in Oporto, demanding the re-opening of the school. Similar actions occurred in other areas. Officers of COPCON, the security force commanded by General Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, handed out arms (over 1000 automatic rifles) to revolutionary organisations to guard against a possible right wing coup. On October 8th, the revolutionary ferment had reached such proportions that General Fabiao, the Army Chief of Staff, was forced to issue a statement cautiously supporting the actions of the left wing rank and file. Clearly, the General Staff has lost control of the army and is incapable of restoring “orthodox military discipline.”
These events clearly show that the revolutionary potential of the soldiers and sailors is far from exhausted. In fact, it has been increased by the continuing conscription of people directly involved in the great events of last year and in no mood to accept barrack room discipline or any attempts by ‘moderates’ to set the clock back. The recent strike of workers in the nationalised steel industry, which was initially met by military strike-breaking and tear-gas attacks on the workers’ demonstrations, also strengthened the links between soldiers and workers, as more and more units fraternised with the strikers.
At the same time, the lurching advance from one crisis to another, in the context of a steadily worsening economic crisis, underlines the urgent need for the organisation of masses of workers and agricultural labourers around a socialist programme capable of ensuring a decisive social transformation. The present situation demonstrates beyond all doubt that the majority of the armed forces, which have already played a key part in the overthrow of fascism, could also play a decisive part in the establishment of a socialist democracy in Portugal, provided the necessary leadership is forthcoming.
Unfortunately we have to say that the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) which has a strong influence in the armed forces and a strong basis among the organised industrial workers, has completely failed to seize the wonderful possibility of inaugurating the construction of a socialist society that appeared on the 25th April 1974. Instead of adopting an independent working class position, the PCP leaders reliance on the radical, but middle class, leaders of the MFA – at each stage of its development, whether under the anti-Communist Spinola or the pro-Communist Goncalves. As it is, they must bear heavy responsibility for the emergence of the present Government.
Election of Officers
The MFA is a phenomenon almost without precedent in history. Arising from the profound radicalisation of the conscripted officers on whom the old regime was forced to rely in the protracted colonial wars, the MFA not only toppled Caetano, but opened the door to the socialist revolution. It moved this way under the enormous pressure of the workers’ movement sparked off by the 25th April coup. The MFA leaders initiated socialist measures not because they had socialist perspectives but because they were forced to by events themselves. Most of the young officers fervently desired the transformation of the archaic conditions of Salazar’s Portugal. However, as the MILITANT predicted at the start, it was inevitable that even the left-wing officers at the head of the MFA, because of their military ties and the freemasonry of war time experience, would attempt to direct the revolution from above, envisaging a ‘permanent coup’ rather than a social transformation from below.
On 8th October the PCP leaders belatedly expressed support for the “widespread and vigorous soldiers’ movement,” despite their participation in the Government trying to suppress that same movement of the soldiers. Yet the PCP has never, ever called for the carrying through of the democratisation of the MFA through the election of officers and control of the forces by elected soldiers’ and sailors’ committees. This is the only guarantee that the armed forces will remain on the side of the workers. The PCP leaders have repeated a million times the slogan MFA=POVO (AFM=PEOPLE); but they never once criticised the fact that the rank and file had no control over the Supreme Council of the Revolution.
These so-called ‘Communists’ held up the MFA leadership, especially under Goncalves, as an immaculate instrument of socialist revolution, above reproach and beyond criticism. Lacking confidence in the capacity of the workers to carry through social change, the PCP leaders preferred to rely on strong measures implemented from above by the pro-PCP officers around Goncalves. They supported the need for “military discipline” and applauded the use of troops against strikers, such as the telephone workers in June.
But Bonapartist methods accompanied by hysterical propaganda through the press and TV by the PCP aimed at branding all opponents as reactionaries and counter-revolutionaries, could not possibly win the support of a majority of workers and especially not a majority of the highly exploited but politically backward peasantry. Apart from the hostility of the provinces, confusion among wide sections of the workers, because of their lack of involvement and ignorance of Government decisions, together with the exclusion of the Socialist Party (PS) from Goncalves Government, they paved the way for a turn to the right in the MFA leadership and the Government.
Internationalism
Undoubtedly, resentment by many officers at their exclusion from Government jobs and anger at the dominant position of the pro-PCP elements played a part too. But this could not have happened had the PCP not handed out jobs to its supporters from above, by kind permission of the MFA instead of demanding elections for all posts. It is also true that strong pressure from the US and Western European Governments contributed to the down-fall of Goncalves Government, but again, the PCP’s position has been completely lacking internationalism. All along, it has accepted the present military-political division of the world as an immutable fact; it has accepted the isolation of the Portuguese revolution, using this to justify the need for a ‘strong state’ to act as a ‘caretaker’ over the state-owned economy on behalf of the working class for the foreseeable future. The Portuguese Communist Party has the support of many of the best militants of the Portuguese working class; but, unfortunately its model of socialism is not the Russia of the October Revolution, but the totalitarian dictatorship of Stalin, Kruschev and Breznev.
What is the alternative? The leaders of the Socialist Party, which has mass support throughout the country and forms the main political group of the present Government, have also completely failed to give a genuinely socialist lead. In practice, Mario Soares has abandoned the socialist programme adopted by the PS Congress in favour of compromise with the MFA ‘moderates’, the Popular Democrats and the Governments of the EEC. (We will return to a fuller analysis of the PS in a later issue). On the other hand, the various left groups, although they include some dedicated revolutionaries, have failed to come to grips with the task of winning mass support in the workers’ organisations. To adopt a ‘programme’ of ‘armed struggle’ with utterly confused perspectives and only small handfuls of support would only lead to defeat and repression.
The success of the Portuguese Revolution depends on a clear perspective and the mobilisation of class support around a programme of workers’ democracy. The future of events is far from decided yet. The reaction although it may attempt to move again, is handicapped by defeats everywhere and especially the rapid decay of the Franco regime. The Portuguese working class, on the other hand, will be assisted by struggles throughout the capitalist world and especially by the coming revolution in Spain.
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