[Militant No. 16, May 1966, p. 2]
By Lynn Walsh
For several weeks, beginning in March and continuing through April, the main cities of South Vietnam have been convulsed by mass demonstrations directed against the military junta and against the enforced occupation of US. imperialism. These demonstrations, often with up to 25,000 participating, have shattered any illusions General Kỳ’s government enjoys even a vestige of popular support. The people of the towns are at one with the population of the countryside in demanding an immediate end to military dictatorship and the withdrawal of U.S. Imperialism which props it up.
Under the pressure of mass demonstrations, the military junta is itself cracking up. In March. General Kỳ tried to dismiss General Chánh Thi, commander of the First Arm Corps, who had shown himself sympathetic to the Buddhists leading anti-government demonstrations. Thi, however, had the support of the army, the police, and the civil service in Đà Nẵng, where he was based, and Kỳ could have removed him only by force. Marines were dispatched to remove this “communist sympathiser,” and, had the enraged General Kỳ not been to back down, there would have been open war between two factions of the “ruling“ junta.
This incident sparked off a series of massive demonstrations in Đà Nẵng. Huế, and later in Sài Gòn. They were not particularly in favour of General Thi. but directed against the corrupt military regime engaged in fighting a civil war against a majority of the South Vietnamese themselves.
General Kỳ hastily made promises that there would be a return to civilian government within two months, After years of bitter experience. however, the Vietnamese were naturally sceptical of such vague promises, and continued to demonstrate in even greater numbers. Kỳ and the junta were forced to go one better and call a “National Political Congress.“At the Congress the junta announced that it had decided “to shorten the time necessary for the establishment of democratic institutions by having immediately a constitution and thus achieving an elected government.” As an indication of their complete lack of confidence in these promises, nearly half the delegates (especially invited by General Kỳ) boycotted the conference.
Manipulation and Horseplay
Thousands of demonstrators continued to demand the instant removal of the military government, having every reason to believe that elections held under its auspices would be rigged. But. in any case, as the Sunday Times correspondent pointed out (17 4 66), “no civilian regime, however solemnly the masquerade of “free elections” may be carried out in three. four or five months’ time, will come to power. It will only come to office by expedient cote cynical manipulation and horse-play.”
A weak. stop-gap, civilian government would be no different from a military junta while U.S. Imperialism continues the war in Vietnam. The universal demand of the Vietnamese is for the withdrawal of US. forces.
After 13 coups since the fall of the infamous Diệm regime. the US. is further than ever from being able to set up a stable government. Militarily, it is further than ever from winning the war. The U.S. Defence Department has even been forced to admit that the present political crisis is impairing the “war effort” while South Vietnamese troops, in uniform are joining in demonstrations against the war. Together with Vietnamese workers, they are refusing to handle American bombs. The Vietcong are scoring success after success, penetrating as far as the air base in Saigon.
This struggle will continue until the peasants have gained their objectives: the expropriation of the landlords, who often extract over 50 per cent of their income in rent, and the distribution of the big estates to the landless.
No government elected by kind permission of Gen. Kỳ or the US would be able to achieve this. The Vietnamese know from experience that these fundamental economic problems can be solved only by taking up arms against the Imperialist power and its puppet
regimes (which attempt to maintain the existing feudalist relationships) and substituting Socialised property for Landlordism.
Reports from Vietnam indicate also growing demoralisation amongst the American troops who are forced to fight the war for imperialism. Trained in modem conventional warfare, they have no stomach for a fight against a guerilla army supported by the population. The Sun, 13 April. 1966, reported that “none of the soldiers in the battle had heard of the anti-American and anti-government demonstrations that were taking place in South Vietnamese cities.” It is inevitable that, when they do hear about, or see, these demonstrations which give the lie to the American propaganda about fighting to bring “freedom and Democracy” to the South Vietnamese, those troops who are being massacred in the jungle will become increasingly reluctant to go on fighting against the wishes of the people they are supposed to be helping.
The U.S. is fighting to maintain a strong position from which to negotiate
Thousands more troops would be needed even to hold the present position inland for much longer
Character of Withdrawal
Suggestions from US officials in Saigon and from the capitalist press in America that there is the likelihood of South Vietnamese government that would tell the U.S. that its military support was no longer necessary, and invite them to withdraw their troops, points to the probable outcome. Walter
Lippman wrote in The Sun 13 April, 1966: “While the undefeated US forces should eventually be withdrawn from the mainland of Asia, I believe that the character of the withdrawal
should be a main subject of negotiations …”
In fact, however, the ”negotiation of the phasing and timing of withdrawal, and their relationship to reciprocal guarantees” would be practical recognition of defeat.
The U.S. will not be forced out of South Vietnam. but its inability to win the war gives it no alternative to negotiating a settlement. As with French imperialism, in Algeria, after finding it impossible to defeat the revolutionary movement, it will have to come to terms and do business. General De Gaulle pointed out long ago that the U.S. Could not win and might as well get out and
recognise an independent, “Tito-type” regime.
How will the revolution in Vietnam develop? In an isolated backward country, where the struggle is being waged on the basis of a peasant guerilla war, and where there is no working class of any size. nor any conscious leadership, it will inevitably take a distorted form. Once free of imperialist domination, South Vietnam would almost certainly unify with the North. and Vietnam as a whole would take the form of a state with a nationalised planned economy, but without democratic
control by the workers, which would require a new political revolution at a later stage.
Nevertheless this is a great blow and, as such, must be supported by the international working-class.
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